Friday, 25 September 2015

Imogen Tyler recommends...

Imogen Tyler is a senior lecturer in Sociology and co-director of the Centre for Gender and Women's Studies at Lancaster University.
She specializes in the area of marginal social identities, a topic which brings together research on asylum and migration, borders, sexual politics, motherhood, race and ethnicity, disability, social class and poverty. Her work focuses on representation and mediation and the relationship between social theory and activism. 
Other recent publications include a special issue of Feminist Review (with C. Gatrell) on the theme of 'Birth', a special issue of Studies in the Maternal (with T. Jensen) on the theme of 'Austerity Parenting', a special issue of Citizenship Studies on the theme of `Immigrant Protest` (2013) and a book (with K. Marciniak), Immigrant Protest: Politics, Aesthetics, and Everyday Dissent (SUNY, forthcoming). 

Imogen is also the author of Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (Zed Books), she shares her favourite from our list below.

We still have much to learn from the Nigerian sociologist Ifi Amadiume, and classics such as Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender andSex in an African Society (1987). In this book, now almost 30 years old, Amadiume blows apart colonial and racist myths about the place of women in African societies and, in so doing, radically challenges a number of foundational assumptions about sex/gender, patriarchy and capitalism. 

Male Daughters, Female Husbands is a historically grounded ethnographic study of the Igbo community in South Eastern Nigeria which details, among many other things, the ways in which (wealthy) women in pre-colonial Igbo communities were able to assume the role of "female husbands" and "male daughters," exercising considerable social power. Amadiume argues that the “matrifocality” of these pre-colonial societies poses a fundamental challenge both to Eurocentric accounts of African history and society and to white western feminist “saviour mentalities”. Amadiume details how the violent oppression of women in Africa underpins the enclosure of the commons, and the inexorable spread of colonial power: A patriarchal-capitalist logic which, as Silvia Federici has detailed, also underpins European modernity. 
Male Daughters, Female Husbands exposure of how particularly oppressive forms of European-style gender inequality and where imported into Africa is an essential resource for understanding neo-colonial political economies today. We need these histories to understand the chaos and inequality of the political present, and the ways in which a political rhetoric of freedom and equality continue to be perversely used to export inequality today. As Amadiume continues to remind us, "the need to support the cause of feminism and social justice in Africa has never been stronger than it is under the present condition of chronic neo-colonialism."

Imogen Tyler is a Professor of Sociology at Lancaster University and is author of Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (Zed, 2013).

Back to Uni Reading List: Politics

It's time to radicalise your bookshelf with our recent titles in Politics.

We Kill Because We Can: From Soldiering to Assassination in the Drone Age by Laurie Calhoun
Welcome to the Drone Age. Where self defense has become naked aggression. Where courage has become cowardice. Where black ops have become standard operating procedure. 
In this remarkable and often shocking book, Laurie Calhoun dissects the moral, psychological and cultural impact of remote-control killing in the Twenty-First Century. How can a mafia hitman be likened to a drone operator conducting a targeted killing? What difference, if any, is there between the Trayvon Martin case and the drone killing of a teen in Yemen? We Kill Because We Can takes a scalpel to the dark heart of Western foreign policy in order to answer these and many other disturbing questions.

The Racket: A Rogue Reporter vs. the Masters of the Universe by Matt Kennard
While working at the Financial Times, investigative journalist Matt Kennard uncovered a scam - a deception and rip-off of immense proportions.
From slanging matches with Henry Kissinger to afternoon coffees with the man who captured Che Guevara, Kennard’s unbridled access over four years to the crème de la crème of the global elite left him with only one conclusion. The world as we know it is run by a squad of cigar-smoking men with big guns, big cash and a reach much too close to home.
But, through encounters with high-profile opponents of the racket, such as Thom Yorke, Damon Albarn, Gael García Bernal and others, Kennard shows that human decency remains. Now it’s time for the world’s citizens to also uncover the racket.

First Measures of the Coming Insurrection by Eric Hazan and Kamo
We have witnessed a beginning, the birth of a new age of revolt and upheaval. In North Africa and the Middle East it took the people a matter of days to topple what were supposedly entrenched regimes. Now, to the west, multiple crises are etching away at a ‘democratic consensus’ that has, since the 1970s, plagued and suppressed any sparks of revolutionary potential. It is time to prepare for the coming insurrection.
In this bold and beautifully written book, Eric Hazan and Kamo provide a short account of what is to be done in the aftermath of a regime’s demise: how to prevent any power from restoring itself and how to reorganize society without a central authority and according to the people’s needs. They argue that neither a leadership reshuffle, in the guise of constitutional progress, nor a transition period between a capitalist social order and a communist horizon will do.

Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles by Clare Land
In this highly original and much-needed book, Clare Land interrogates the often fraught endeavors of activists from colonial backgrounds seeking to be politically supportive of Indigenous struggles. Blending key theoretical and practical questions, Land argues that the predominant impulses which drive middle-class settler activists to support Indigenous people cannot lead to successful alliances and meaningful social change unless they are significantly transformed through a process of both public political action and critical self-reflection. 
Based on a wealth of in-depth, original research, and focusing in particular on Australia, where - despite strident challenges - the vestiges of British law and cultural power have restrained the nation's emergence out of colonizing dynamics, Decolonizing Solidarity provides a vital resource for those involved in Indigenous activism and scholarship.

More Politics here.

Paul French recommends...

Paul French is a leading expert on North Korea and is a widely published analyst and commentator on Asia.  His previous books include A History of North Korea, Carl Crow - A Tough Old China Hand: The Life, Times, and Adventures of an American in Shanghai, and Through the Looking Glass: China's Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao.

Paul was awarded the 2013 Edgar for best fact crime for his international best-seller Midnight in Peking.

Most recently, he has just released the new edition of North Korea: State of Paranoia for Zed Books. 

We asked Paul about his favourite Zed Book, below is his response.

When you edit a series of books you love every one of them.  But the publishing Gods being what they are, some books just don't get the attention they deserve - perhaps they're too ahead of the curve?  I really believe Gabriel Lafitte's Spoiling Tibet: China and Resource Nationalism on the Roof of the World was one such book.  So I'm grabbing this opportunity to talk about it again - it's still amazingly prescient and an in-depth study of something that affects us all - the spoilation of Tiber and the dislocation of its traditional communities to mine rare earths - the chemical elements found in every smart phone and laptop as well as, perhaps ironically, most clean energy, health care and environmental technology.

This year is the 50th anniversary of the Chinese occupation of Tibet.  Beijing chose to celebrate this occupation by holding a large parade in the Tibetan capital Lhasa featuring largely marching Chinese soldiers to underline the occupation of the territory Beijing calls an "autonomous region".  Spoiling Tibet talks about a very different place; a place where Beijing's 12th Five-Year Plan, from 2011 to 2015, has led to massive investment in copper, gold, silver, chromium and lithium mining in the region, with devastating environmental and social outcomes.  These "outcomes" include destruction of traditional nomadic pastoral lands, spoliation of air, water and earth, forced relocation, Chinese occupation of Tibetan ancestral lands and vast profits extracted from Tibetan earth and made by Chinese state companies controlled by the Communist Party.

Your laptop, e-reader, smart phone likely contain rare earths extracted from Tibet's sacred mountains.  The profits from these mining operations goes to support the continued harsh Chinese repressive state apparatus in Tibet.  Yet it remains a little known and talked about issue.  Gabriel's book describes the process and the consequences in detail and so deserves to be read at a time when Tibetans are fighting to save their physical environment as well as their religious landscape from destruction.

Paul French is the series editor for Zed Books Asian Arguments and tweets on @chinarhyming 

Back to Uni Reading List: Economics

As part of our 'Back To Uni half-price sale' this week, we've put together a few reading lists of our highlights over the last year if you just can't pick (we know, you want them all).

We're kicking off with Economics (because Yanis).

The Global Minotaur:America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy by Yanis Varoufakis

Yanis Varoufakis, former finance minister of Greece and the 'emerging rock-star of Europe's anti-austerity uprising', explodes the myth that financialisation, ineffectual regulation of banks, greed and globalization were the root causes of both the Eurozone crisis and the global economic crisis. Rather, they are symptoms of a much deeper malaise which can be traced all the way back to the Great Crash of 1929, then on through to the 1970s: the time when a Global Minotaur was born.
An essential account of the socio-economic events and hidden histories that have shaped the world as we now know it.

Change Everything: Creating an Economy for the Common Good by Christian Felber

Is it possible for businesses to have a bottom line that is not profit and endless growth, but human dignity, justice, sustainability and democracy? Or an alternative economic model that is untainted by the greed and crises of current financial systems?
Christian Felber says it is. Moreover, in Change Everything he shows us how. The Economy for the Common Good is not just an idea, but has already become a broad international movement with thousands of people, hundreds of companies, and dozens of communities and organizations participating, developing and implementing it. This is a remarkable blueprint for change that will profoundly influence debates on reshaping our economy for the future.

Co-operatives in a Post-Growth Era: Creating Co-operative Economics by Sonja Novkovic and Tom Webb (eds)

For the past three decades, neoclassical doctrine has dominated economic theory and policy. The balance of power has shifted to protect private interests, resulting in unprecedented damage to the environment and society, with no solution in sight as more austerity and less government continues to be posited as the answer to the oncoming waves of crisis.
It doesn't have to be this way. Featuring a remarkable roster of internationally renowned critical thinkers, Co-operatives in a Post-Growth Era presents a feasible alternative for a more environmentally sustainable and equitable economic system - specifically, the co-operative business model.

More of our Economics titles here.

Thursday, 10 September 2015

Nawal El Saadawi events in London

We are very excited to be welcoming Nawal El Saadawi to London in October to mark the release of beautiful new editions of her classic works Woman at Point Zero, The Hidden Face of Eve and God Dies by the Nile and other Novels.

Described by the Financial Times as 'The most influential feminist thinker in the Arab world over the past half-century', Nawal El Saadawi is the author of over 50 books and short stories. She was imprisoned in the 1980s by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat after publishing a feminist magazine and fled Egypt in 1988 after receiving threats from conservative Islamists. She returned to Cairo in 1996 and took part in the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Vidisha Biswas, sales director at Zed Books, says: “These beautifully redesigned classics are a celebration of our biggest selling author Nawal El Saadawi, one of the leading feminists of her generation who has braved prison, exile and death threats in her fight against female oppression. These titles will shock, move, inform and inspire readerships old and new.”

We hope you can join us at one of the events which Nawal is doing in London in October, please follow the links below for more details:


Friday, 4 September 2015

Richard Falk - Playing Three Dimensional Chess in the Middle East

Kurdish PKK fighters are the most effective fighting force against ISIS

The terrifying forward march of ISIS is currently being resisted most effectively by Kurdish leftist fighters in the PKK. 

However, these PKK fighters are facing increasing attacks and repression from the Turkish government, who seem to view them as more than an enemy than ISIS itself. 

What is going on? In this blog post, Richard Falk - world renowned expert on international law and author of Chaos and Counterrevolution: After the Arab Spring, provides an illuminating guide to the complex situation.


Three dimensional chess, played on multiple boards, is an immense challenge because of its great complexity. There are so many variations and combinations as to make it impossible to develop guidance for players seeking improvement.

And so it seems in the Middle East. The complexity is overwhelming the players producing a continuous series of adjustments that seem to juggle the identity of friends and enemies with little rhyme or reason.

Take the recent alignment of Turkey and the United States with the announced goal of battling ISIS. At the same time, Turkey has greatly escalated its effort to limit, if not destroy, its Kurdish adversaries at home and in Syria. What makes this unfolding situation particularly puzzling is that the Kurdish armed groups, including the Turkish Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), have proved the most successful forces combatting ISIS in recent months.

Breakdown of negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish government

From Ankara’s perspective there is logic to the seeming irrationality of stepping up the fight against the strongest enemy of your main enemy. Ever since the Iraqi Kurds established their state within a state in northern Iraq and the Syrian Kurds seemed within reach of their goal of establishing Rojava (or Syrian Kurdistan), the Turkish Kurdish movement, led by PKK, has evidently had second thoughts about negotiating with the Turkish government an end to their struggle for rights and autonomy. This Kurdish rethinking was heightened after the Turkish elections of June 7th failed to give the governing AKP the electoral majority it needed to form a government while the Kurdish party, HDP, with presumed links to the PKK, gained more than 10% of the vote, and with it, 80 seats in the Turkish Parliament.

In this atmosphere of political uncertainty the Turkish government faced a mounting internal security threat. Between June 7 and July 24, there were over 281 violent attacks carried out in Turkey by PKK operatives, including several lethal assaults on police and military personnel. In retaliation the Turkish armed forces launched air attacks against PKK positions in Qandil Mountain in northern Iraq. In the midst of this upsurge of violence the PKK on July 11 unilaterally ended the two-year ceasefire with the government. President Erdogan speaking for Turkey responded by terminating the  reconciliation process that in recent years had been seeking an end to the conflict by diplomatic compromise.

Protesters in Gezi Park 

Impact of Gezi Park protests

The Turkish government since 2004 has made it a controversial centerpiece of its program to find ways to end the 30 year conflict with the Kurds responsible for the loss of an estimated 40,000 lives. Progress was made so long as the AKP was in secure control of the Turkish governing process, but as its hold on power weakened after the Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013, high-level corruption scandals, and the open break with the Gulen Movement, the PKK seemed to reevaluate its options.

Additional factors push against internal peace in Turkey. The Kurdish militants in the Qandil base areas apparently reacted to two developments: first, the political success of Kurdish armed struggle in Iraq and Syria; secondly, a concern that the rewards of the reconciliation process would be reaped by Kurdish politicians and business people who took no risks to advance the national movement in Turkey, while the PKK fighters enduring decades of hardship and risk would not be benefitted by a negotiated political solution.

If these were not complications enough, there are other critical issues involved, perhaps, most of all, the Turkish preoccupation with toppling the regime in Damascus of Bashir al-Assad. It is relevant to recall that before 2011, and the Arab Spring, when Turkish regional diplomacy was capturing the imagination by its call for ‘zero problems with neighbors,’ it was Assad’s Syria that served as the poster child of the policy. Earlier tensions were dissolved, friendship at the leadership levels of both countries was exhibited, and Syria and Turkey overnight reconciled their differences.

The Arab Spring

Then came the Arab Spring, and when it hit Syria shortly after the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the Damascus government responded with fury against initially peaceful demonstrators. Turkey, along with the UN, tried for months to coax the Assad leadership into meeting the demands of the Syrian people by instituting democratic reforms. Assad seemed to agree, but no power-sharing steps were taken. Instead there was a spread of insurgent activity, and an intensification of violence by the government, including the indiscriminate bombing of Syrian cities and towns. The bodies piled up and tens of thousand refugees streamed across the Turkish border, creating a major humanitarian challenge.

Against this background, Turkey increasingly sided with the rebel forces.  Istanbul becoming the center of operations for anti-Assad political activity of the Friends of Syria ( a loose coalition put together by the United States and Turkey). Various forms of military assistance were channeled to the Free Syrian Army and other rebel forces in Syria by Turkey. Early in the conflict Ankara believed that the balance of forces had shifted against Assad, and that the Syrian regime would collapse in a few weeks. It was mistakenly supposed that Syria, like Libya, would be easy prey to a popular uprising, forgetting that the Damascus government had loyal support from a series of important Syrian minorities as well as from large segment of the urban business world.

The Turkish leadership was deeply criticized by its internal opponents for dragging the country into the Syrian maelstrom. The secular opposition, centered in the CHP party, accused the Erdogan leadership of pursuing a dangerous course of action throughout the region, including Syria, by backing an Islamic centered opposition. It seemed increasingly clear that the al Nusra Front the core of opposition to Assad was linked to al Qaeda. In this mix, ISIS came along to mount an even bigger challenge to Damascus. It is not surprising that given these developments the Turkish leadership was initially reluctant to confront ISIS, the biggest threat to their biggest enemy! And still wobbles on the tightrope that stretches between opposing Assad and fighting PKK and ISIS.

All of the above makes clear that playing the diplomatic version of three dimensional chess in the Middle East is not a game for beginners. And yet  beginners are dominating play with horrible consequences for the affected peoples.


For more on the PKK see also Paul White's The PKK: Coming Down from the Mountains


Wednesday, 26 August 2015

Yanis Varoufakis on China: Between the West's Bankruptocracy and the East's fragile strength

In this extract from The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy, Yanis Varoufakis looks at the underlying weaknesses of the Chinese economy, its deep and complex connections with the rest of the global economy and the policy dilemmas it will face in the future. 

China soars, then plunges into angst 

On 4th December 2010, Wikileaks posted an official cable relating a conversation (circa 28th March 2009) between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. In it we read: The Secretary also noted the challenges posed by China's economic rise, asking, "How do you deal toughly with your banker?" The reader may, understandably, protest a startling omission in this book: While promising to speak to the future of the world economy, there has been almost no mention of China. Undoubtedly, the swashbuckling reemergence of what was, historically, one of the world's leading powers is the big story of our times. Its bearing upon the future will be as significant as that of the United States during the 20th century. Of this I have no doubt.

Nevertheless, neither the nature of China's rise nor its future impact can be understood without a good grasp of the world as shaped by the Global Minotaur. For, come to think of it, the Soaring Dragon not only grew up in an environment shaped by the Global Minotaur but must also mature in an unstable world occasioned by the latter's demise. Deng Xiao Ping's new course for China was modelled on Japan and the South East Asian tigers. The organising principle behind the Chinese plan for growth was that of a dual economy in which special economic zones would punctuate China with small Singapores or Hong Kongs, islands of intense capitalist activity in a sea of unlimited labour power. Meanwhile, the centre would direct investment (very much along the lines of the Japanese model) but  would also negotiate technology transfers and foreign direct investment directly with Western and Japanese multinational corporations.

China's global positioning

As for China's global positioning, it would resemble that of South East Asia, in seeking sources of demand for its export-led growth from the United States and Europe. It can be safely suggested that China owes its élan to the Global Minotaur. American, European and Japanese multinationals played a crucial role in setting up shop in China and using its low costs in order to export to the rest of the world, especially to the United States. At the same time, cheap Chinese imports into the United States has helped Wal-Mart style American companies to squeeze prices to unbelievably low levels, helping in the drive to minimise US inflation, a key requirement (as we saw in Chapter 4) for the continuing capital flows into the United States that kept the Minotaur happy and joyous. As China was learning the ropes, becoming one of the Minotaur's favourite feeders, its leaders became keen observers of US policies that had the potential to affect China's growth path. In particular, they learned important lessons from the 1985 Plaza Accord which, as we saw, condemned Japan to an untenable position, and from the 1998 South East Asia crisis that was caused by America's successful bid to rid the tigers of financial regulation and expose their financial markets to the vagaries of Wall Street, the City and the European banks.

A widely accepted current hypothesis is that, because of these experiences, the Chinese are resisting America's asphyxiating pressures to revalue the Chinese currency (the Remnibi, or RMB). Seemingly, following the Crash of 2008, the United States are pushing hard for an RMB re-valuation for the same reasons they pushed the Japanese in the 1980s to sign the Plaza Accord. The conventional view here is that the US government, in its haste to do something about the low level of demand in its domestic market, is trying to do what all governments do in a recessionary climate: To drum up demand from abroad, usually by devaluing their currency (or, equivalently, by enticing foreigners to re-value theirs). Once more, I do not thing that the standard explanation is the whole story. While American firms whose base is predominantly in the United States are pushing for an appreciation of the RMB, for the reasons stated above, it is not at all clear that the heralded currency wars between China and the United States are of the traditional type just put forward.

There are two reasons for remaining sceptical on this issue: First, it is not at all clear that US policy makers have accepted that the Global Minotaur is finished; that the strategy of expanding, or at least not shrinking, the US twin deficits must be abandoned. Secondly, some of the largest, best endowed and most dynamic American corporations would be hit hard if the RMB were to re-value. For they are already producing a great deal of their output within China, before exporting it to the rest of the world. An RMB appreciation would cut into their profit margins. Every iPad, each HP computer, even American cars (many of which use Chinese manufactured parts) will have to increase in price. Indeed, while the American government is lobbying with Beijing to re-value the RMB, countless Western multinationals are threatening China to withdraw (and resettle in India or even Africa) if the RMB is allowed to rise significantly against the US dollar.

China's impact on Latin America

Besides the US-Chinese nexus, China's startling growth made an indelible mark on the rest of the developing nations. Some were devastated by the competition but others were liberated from a relationship of dependence on the West and its multinational corporations. Mexico was among the first group of countries to have suffered from China's rise. Because it had chosen to invest much energy into becoming a low-wage manufacturer on the periphery of the United States (and a member of the US-Canada-Mexico free trade zone known as NAFTA), China's emergence was a nightmare for Mexican manufacturers. However, it was a godsend for countries ranging from Australia (which in effect put its vast mineral resources at the disposal of Chinese firms) to Argentina and from Brazil to Angola (which in 2007 received more funding, as direct investment mainly into its oil industry, than the IMF had leant to the whole world). Latin America is possibly the one continent that was changed forever by China's emergence into the Global Minotaur's major feeder. Argentina and Brazil turned their fields into production units supplying 1.3 billion Chinese consumers with foodstuff, and also dug up their soil in search of minerals that would feed China's hungry factories. Cheap Chinese labour and China's market access to the West (courtesy of World Trade Organisation membership) is allowing Chinese manufacturers to undercut their Mexican and other Latin American competitors in the manufacture of low value-added sectors such as shoes, toys and textiles.

This two-pronged effect causes Latin America to de-industrialise and return to the status of a primary goods producer. These developments have a global reach. For if Brazil and Argentina turn their eyes toward Asia, as they already have started doing, they may abandon their long term struggle to break into the food markets of the United States and Europe, from which they have been barred by severe protectionist measures in favour of American, German and French farmers. Already, Latin America's shifting trade patterns are affecting the orientation of a region which was, until very recently, thought of as the United States' backyard. Latin America's governments choose not to resist their countries' transformation into China's primary goods producers. They may not like deindustrialisation much but it is a far cry from the prospect of another crisis like that of 1998-2002 and another visit from an IMF seeking to exact more pounds of flesh from their people. Returning to Secretary Clinton's remark at this section's beginning, it is clear what she meant by referring to China as America's banker. As we see in the graph below, the United States has, since 2000, shifted its reliance for financing its budget deficit from Europe and Japan to China.

US - China currency wars

But what exactly was Mrs Clinton referring to when she hinted at "dealing toughly" with China? Did she mean, yet again, pressurising Beijing to revalue its currency? And was the reason the stated purpose of limiting the US trade deficit with China? Possibly. However, an even more pressing reason is to preserve the profits of US multinationals which, since the 1980s, had set up production facilities in countries like Mexico and Brazil, and which are now under threat from severe Chinese competition. In a Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC) radio interview, Mexican economist Rogelio de la O stated in 2009: "Even strong companies that are subsidiaries of international firms are very, very 18 America's bankers The graph below looks at four distinct years and decomposes the ownership of US assets (public and private) by non-US government or government controlled financial institutions. It is clear that after 2003 America's old protégés, Europe and Japan, are fading as its financial supporters. The Chinese state is, meanwhile, pushing its contribution through the roof. In this sense, the Minotaur's recent travails have posed a serious threat to the US assets that China already owns. Increase in US assets (in $ billion) owned by foreign state institutions America's conundrum in the face of stupendous Chinese growth is that the Crash of 2008 stopped the Minotaur from quickmarching the Chinese to its tune. Up until then, the Chinese depended upon the Minotaur for their trade surpluses and were, thus, forced to reinvest them in the United States, either by buying US government debt or in the private sector.

Death of the Global Minotaur

With the Minotaur no longer capable of absorbing increasing quantities of Chinese goods, at a rate similar to the pre-2008 period (especially now that China has shifted production to high-tech, big item products like superfast railways), China does not automatically need to send all of its capital to New York. This leaves China with only one reason for investing hugely in US assets: the fact that it has already invested hugely in... US assets and does not want to see its people's accumulated hard labour lose much of its worth were the United States to be hit by a public debt crisis. At the same time, and despite its public proclamations, the United States' government does not have the backing of a large segment of American corporations to pursue a Plazatype agreement that would see the RMB slide against the dollar.

Unable to expand its deficits, like it did when the Minotaur was exploding with youthful energy, and lacking the clout to do to China what it had done to Japan in 1985, the United States is finding it hard to decide how to deal with China. discouraged at the way their volumes have fallen and their margins have been totally squeezed. The China effect is kind of overwhelming."  China too, unable to secure sufficient demand for its industries in the absence of a roaring Minotaur, is in a bind and has ended up responding in surprising ways. For instance, Brazil's Central Bank revealed that, while in 2009 China's foreign direct investment in the Latin American country was only $300 million, in 2010 it rose to $17 billion. Why? What was China up to? As everyone knows, for a while now, Brazil, Argentina etc. were being enriched by the Dragon's purchases of iron ore, soya beans, oil, meat etc.

But, when the Global Minotaur perished in 2008, and these economies continued to grow on the back of their primary exports to China, their currencies shot up in relation to the dollar. Consider three immediate effects of these developments: First, Latin American high growth rates attracted a new carry trade, this time from the United States whose growth rate and interest rates hovered around zero, thus motivating a capital flight away from America. Secondly, new Chinese industrial imports rushed into Brazil and Argentina as their local prices were falling, in view of the local currencies strengthening vis-à-vis the dollar (and, by pegged association, the RMB). Thirdly, to perpetuate this cycle, China increased its investments in Latin America. Now, this third development is of some significance. Up until recently, China would invest in Africa and elsewhere in projects the ultimate purpose of which was to secure raw materials for its domestic industries.

With these new investments into countries like Brazil, China seems to be pursuing a new strategy: That of creating something like its own Global Plan! Of directing part of its outbound capital flows to countries other than the United States in an effort to stimulate, there, in those foreign places, demand for Chinese goods. The broader significance of China's relation to the rest of the emerging nations comes in the form of clues on how China will seek to address the gaping hole left in the overall demand for its exports by the Minotaur's 2008 misfortune. What is clear is that China, the United States and the rest of the emerging nations will, from now on, engage in a triangular game of chicken. With no dominant party in sight, and no clear objectives for any of them, the prospects of a new, efficient (formal or informal) Global Surplus Recycling Mechanism seem slim and distant. Which means that the Minotaur's legacy is a rather bleak one for the world economy.

Epilogue: Between the West's Bankruptocracy and the East's fragile strength

Judging by the mood in the centres of power, that which we used to call the Third World is having a good crisis. The 'emerging economies' are growing at the expense of Europe and the United States, the two loci of long-established capitalism which, regrettably, have spawned a new socio-economic 'system': Bankruptocracy. The Global Minotaur's 2008 moment has raised the prospect of a worldwide realignment. And yet, the Minotaur is still in the room, threatening to wreak havoc. Wounded it may be, perhaps mortally, but its imprint is still all over our world. When it was hurt, and Wall Street's near-collapse sapped its energy, America's abandoned protégés failed to rise to the occasion. 20 Europe entered a crisis of its own device which is endangering sixty years of European integration. South East Asia found itself more dependent than before on a powerful neighbour, even if this time it is not Japan but China. Japan itself, which had its own recession well before the Minotaur's infirmity, seems to have made its peace with stagnation. Of all the major non-US economic powerhouses, only China is dynamic enough to pretend to the Minotaur's sceptre. But China knows it cannot yet perform that illustrious role, unable to create demand even for its own output. Its most recent efforts to create its own Global Plan, in particular in relation to Latin America, stirred up tensions with its potential protégés (e.g. Brazil), reminding us that America's own Global Plan only came to pass with minimal resistance because, at the time of its design and implementation, the rest of the world laid in ruins. Some think that China only needs to bide its time, certain that in its fullness it will prevail.

The Chinese leadership is less sure. They understand intimately the scarcity of total demand in the post-Minotaur world. They know that Germany, Japan and China are all fully reliant for their very survival on maintaining aggressive, expanding surpluses. But this also requires someone to absorb those surpluses as deficits. That someone used to be the Global Minotaur. Now, it is gone and nothing seems likely to replace it. To buy time, the Chinese government is stimulating its growing economy and keeps it shielded from currency revaluations, in the hope that vibrant growth can continue. But they see the omens. And they are not good. On the one hand, China's consumption-toGDP ratio is falling; a sure sign that the domestic market cannot generate enough demand for China's gigantic factories. On the other hand, their fiscal injections are causing real estate bubbles. If these are unchecked, they may burst and thus cause a catastrophic domestic unwinding. But how do you deflate a bubble without choking off growth? That was the multi-trillion dollar question that Alan Greenspan failed to answer. It is not clear that the Chinese leadership have an answer either.

Thursday, 20 August 2015

What Future for Yanis Varoufakis? A Man of the 'System' Rebelling against It

Yanis Varoufakis is in the process of becoming an important figure in Greek political life and beyond. In the break-up process affecting Syriza, which seems now well underway, he will be called to play a major role, together with the former Minister of energy, Panayiotis Lafazanis, and the President of the Parliament, Mrs Zoe Kostantopoulou. But Yanis Varoufakis has also indubitably become a major figure for the Left which is critical of the Euro and someone who will be an important factor in the political reconfigurations which are in the offing. There are good reasons for this.

The new edition of Varoufakis's book, The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy was published in July with a new foreword by Paul Mason. 

This article orginally appeared on the Global Research website and was translated by Anne-Marie de Grazia.


A man of the “system” rebelling against it

By Jacques Sapir

Yanis Varoufakis is a rare case, without being an oddity. He is an economist who has taken squarely pro-European positions in the past, but who is at present very critical as far as the governance of the European Union is concerned, and in consideration of the behaviour of European leaders. He is also an economist who came out in favor of the Euro, for essentially theoretical reasons, but who is today quietly considering the possibility of an exit of his country from the Eurozone. Evidently, his experience as a Minister, and as a negotiator, has changed the vision he had of the Euro and there is much to learn from his experience for any true Left. The Left which is critical of the Euro, or even anti-Euro, must be sensitive to his trajectory. He comes from inside the “system,” but in the same time he is apprehending it critically, and he declares himself ready to break with it rather than accepting what one is reduced to calling a capitulation, to which Tsipras finally had to give in. This is a most important point. At any rate, Varoufakis is keeping up his criticism, be it against the Diktat of July 13th or against the new memorandum which is to be ratified by August 20th. He recently declared on the BBC: “Ask all those who know the state of Greek finances and they will tell you that this agreement will not work»[2]. His moral authority and his competence as a former Minister of finances are playing in his favour.

For the agreement which Greece and the other countries of the Eurozone are going to achieve will not solve anything and it is “done for” even before it has seen the light of day. The situation in Greece has terribly deteriorated in July and in the beginning of August, as a result of the measures which were taken against Greece by the Central European Bank. Some 86 or 89 billion euros are mentioned for this agreement. But today, it is clear that between 110 and 120 would be needed. Similarly, it is evident that one would have to proceed very quickly to the annulment of part of the Greek debt. Even the IMF has been saying so since early July. Yet, we know that Germany is refusing flatly and that it is dragging its feet to sign this agreement [3]. Under such conditions, it is just as evident that the agreement, which should be concluded by August 20th will not help anything and that it will be overtaken and rendered obsolete by events to come. Moreover, the economic situation in Greece keeps deteriorating. Clearly, an exit from the Eurozone remains more than ever in the cards for the weeks, or months, to come [4].

An image of competence

So that Varoufakis has become the very incarnation of a competent Left (he was a highly esteemed and recognized professor of economics), yet one which does not abandon any of its critical dimensions and who makes use of his competence in order to push ever further his criticism of the « system. » He is incidentally a product of the ruling classes (even if his father was jailed during the Greek civil war for his communist sympathies) but one who is not playing according to the codes of his background.

He is, need we remind of it, a specialist in game theory, a domain which has much thrilled economists [5]. He is recognized by his peers, whether they are economists of the orthodox or the heterodox currents. His book, The Global Minotaur, received a well-earned international success [6]. Moreover, he did not hesitate to conceive a credible alternative plan for Greece, which could have avoided the country the shameful capitulation to which it was compelled to, as well as the looming disaster of a new memorandum, at a time when many people are still maintaining that « there is no alternative. »

A future leader of the anti-Euro Left ?

Yanis Varoufakis was a charismatic Minister of finances, who did not hesitate to voice certain truths within the stuffy setting of European reunions. He clearly has the potential for becoming the herald of an anti-Euro Left. The fact that the decided at first in favor of the Euro, and that he then considered the possibility of an exit from the Euro, lends him an undisputable authority on this point.

Moreover, he has hosted on his blog Stefano Fassina’s appeal for a front of anti-Euro liberation movements [7]. This is an eminently symbolic gesture. For Fassina too is an insider of the « system. » He was vice-minister of finances of the Letta government in Italy. He is an influential member of the center-left party, the Democratic Party, to which belongs the present Prime-Minister, Matteo Renzi. However, today, he has become one of the most virulent opponents to the Euro in Italy and his appeal is nothing less than one of fiercest polemical tracts which have been written against the single currency. Varoufakis and Fassina are representative of the fracture which has occurred inside the « system, » or what one of my Italian friends, Professor Bagnai, calls the PUDE, or Partito Unico Dell’Euro. Their trajectories bringing them to anti-Euro positions carry the more significance for their having earlier been supporters of the Euro. One could say the same of Oskar Lafontaine who, as the leader of the SPD, was one of the founding fathers of the Euro and who, in 2013, made a radical change to becoming a resolute opponent of the single currency. This development is now very important. More and more the camp of anti-Euro, or at the very least Euro-critical economists and politicians, is being joined by people who were even recently still supporters of the Euro, but who have been caught up by the reality of the Euro and who have figured out that there is no future possible in Europe as long as one is holding onto the Euro.

Moreover, Varoufakis has been attacked most viciously, not only in the Greek political spheres, where some would like to sue him for high treason, but also in the Europeist circles of Brussels and elsewhere. He has answered roundly to these criticisms on his blog and in the press. Concentrating upon himself the hatred of the Europhiles and of the supporters of the Euro, he is quite normally attracting the sympathies of those who fight against the Euro.

A figure of protest

It is evident therefore that Yanis Varoufakis is cumulating the characteristics which should make him into an example for a certain left, but not for all the left, and certainly not in the ranks of the French government, a government supposed to belong to the Left. For the personality of Yanis Varoufakis, and especially the discourse of which he is the carrier, are clearly insufferable for this moderate right disguised as a « government Left. » It is clear that nothing in his personality can be attractive to the official socialists, to people like Moscovici, or Martin Schulz and Sigmar Gabriel, Michel Sapin or François Hollande. In short, the so-called “government socialists” who are the heirs to Hebert and Noske of the Germany of 1918.

Quite the opposite; Yanis Varoufakis is the very example of the fact that, contrarily to what these are asserting, there are alternatives and that austerity is not unavoidable. He is the living proof of their compromises, of their cowardice and of their multiple treasons, when other roads were open to them. Which is why he must necessarily be hated by them. But he will certainly attract to himself some of the “trouble-makers” of the French Socialist Party, at any rate those who did not accept the Diktat of July 13th, as well as the partisans of Arnaud Montebourg, and of course, the members of the radical left. Varoufakis is the living proof that other policies are possible in the European Union, even if one is entitled to think that he did not carry out this project fully, and to its full consequences. In any case, he brought it quite far, and it is not his fault if the project could not be carried through.

It remains to be seen if he knows that he has become a symbolic figure and if he will be able to live up to the symbols he is presently incarnating. For, and this is the contradiction which he will have to face up to and solve, he, the man who always wanted to stand for rational government, a legacy of his work on game theory, [8], will have to admit that he has become an actor in a game which no longer obeys rationality but one in which symbols and ideology are occupying a major place. At the same time, in politics, analysis too calls for rational calculations. If he doesn’t want to lose himself, he will have to hold firm onto both poles of this contradiction.


Jacques Sapir is a French economist who currently runs the blog He studies Russian economic policy,  financial crises, economic transitions, economic institutions, and individual behaviour. In 2000, he started investigating the interactions between regime changes, the structuration of financial regimes, and macroeconomic instabilities. Since 2007, Sapir’s research focuses on the current global financial crisis in general, and the Eurozone crisis in particular.

Thursday, 6 August 2015

Do-gooders doing bad, gender in oil-rich states and voices of protest: A reading list for African politics today

This summer, the Washington Post's political research blog The Monkey Cage has been running an "African Politics Summer Reading Spectacular", publishing an ongoing series of posts based on books in their excellent summer reading list. With their informed and intelligent analysis of current affairs, these offer eye-opening insights and critique of African politics today. A number of authors from Zed Book's renowned Africa list are featured, covering issues such as the growth of oil rich Sub-Saharan states to a growth in street protest across the continent. Below is a round-up of some of The Monkey Cage's best blogs - visit the Washington Post to check them out in full. 

Governance, gender and no guarantees in Africa’s oil-rich states

In her interview with journalist Laura Seay, author Celeste Hicks discusses how, in countries rich with natural resources such as Chad, a "resource curse theory" has been developed to explain how poverty still flourishes despite great natural wealth. Hicks suggests a "governance curse" to run alongside this, saying that the problem is management, not oil per se. Part of the problem is a gender gap within the oil industry, she argues, saying that where gender equality has been part of a wider discussion, such as in East Africa, it can lead to many positive developments regarding land rights and resources. Despite this, within the oil industry, like many science, technology and engineering professions, substantive blocks mean women remain locked out.

Celeste Hicks is a journalist, and author of Africa's New Oil: Power, Pipelines and Future Fortunes, available now for £12.99/$18.95.

‘Protest is always hopeful': Examining the third wave of popular protest in Africa

"First, always listen to African voices, and second, don’t assume that these are monolithic" say Zachariah Mampilly and Adam Branch in their interview with Kim Yi Dionne, as they explain current street movements in relation to the anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s, and later struggles for economic justice in the 1980s and 90s. They draw a distinction between voices of the establishment, and what they call the "Political society" of ordinary Africans. Understanding this alternative polity, with its own demands and organisational strategies, is key to understanding the "third wave" of political protest in Africa. This fascinating outline analyses the causes of this divide, and how the resentment and split between civil and political society has caused an enormous upsurge in street protests. In their book "Africa Uprising", the authors examine four "third wave" protests in details: Occupy Nigeria, post-election demonstrations in Ethiopia in 2005, demonstrations in Sudan and Uganda's "Walk to Work" movement. Within this new wave of street-based movements, Mampilly and Branch see, at the core, hope:

It is easy to forget, especially in the post-9/11 United States, that the greatest political victories were rarely won through elections but required large-scale political mobilization. People who took to the streets managed to end wars, helped curtail racial, gender or sexual discrimination, and challenged unfair economic practices. In other words, they found ways to express their democratic rights in far more substantive ways than merely casting a vote every four years. And they do this without the permission of the elites who have fully captured the U.S. electoral process.
In contrast, many African countries are still struggling to define the basic compact between government and society and so there isn’t as much deference to the political leadership, regardless of whether they came to power via elections or not. African scholars have been talking about “choiceless democracies” for three decades now, a concept we increasingly relate to as U.S. citizens. We believe we have much to learn from African protest, in regards to both the challenges it will inevitably confront and how those challenges may be overcome.

"Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change" by Zachariah Mampilly and Adam Branch is out now from Zed Books for £14.99 / $21.95

Do-gooders, do no harm: What are the best–and worst–ways to help those mired in international conflicts?

Laura Seay begins her interview with Alex de Waal, editor of "Advocacy in Conflict", by asking him timely and pressing questions about the rise of the superstar activist.
"An authentic activism requires making the affected people the protagonist: letting them define the issues, and welcoming their complicated manifold stories. It demands asking difficult questions about the use and misuse of power by western governments and their friends,"
 says de Waal. He goes on to describe the ecology of advocacy and activism across the world, and specifically in Africa, such as #Kony2012, where international activists engaged in a "grossly over-simplified" campaign around the Lord's Resistance Army, or campaigns around rare earth minerals in the DRC. In the end, he suggests, activism must focus on local actors (including within local activism) rather than external, international pressure, and in Africa non-violent organisation and action is the key to long-term social change.

Edited by Alex de Waal, "Advocacy in Conflict: Critical Perspectives on Transnational Activism" is out now for £18.99 / $27.95

Keep your eye on the Monkey Cage reading list this summer for more excellent Africa coverage, including "Africa: Why Economists Get it Wrong" by Morten Jerven, described by the Economist as "a devastating critique of the economics profession".

Friday, 24 July 2015

Richard Falk: Turkey under Erdoğan

The horror of the suspected ISIS bombing of a Turkish young socialist meeting in Suruc has highlighted how Turkey is bound-up with both Europe and the Middle East geographically, politically and culturally. The issues the country confronts are complex and multi-layered.

In this extract from his powerful new book Chaos and Counterrevolution: After the Arab Spring, Richard Falk, a world-renowned scholar of international law and former UN Rapporteur on Palestine, provides a highly informative and clear overview of developments in Turkey. He looks book at the historic developments in Turkey since 2002, and its shifting and complex foreign policy.


My relationship to Turkey is far closer than it is to any of the other countries in the Middle East. My wife is Turkish, we have made long annual visits to Turkey for the past twenty years, and I have had the opportunity to know a wide range of Turkish political personalities quite closely.

I have also been motivated to write about the Turkish government and its leadership because it has so often been misunderstood. Western perceptions of Turkish political life are distorted by several interacting factors: the hostility of Turkey’s secular establishment to the governing AKP (Justice and
Development Party) and its dominant leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Turkey’s tensions with Israel and the United States; and the global media exhibiting hostility to Turkey due to the influence of these political forces.

While I share some of the criticisms directed at the AKP and Erdoğan, especially since 2011, I am also much more appreciative of their political, economic, and ethical performance than their harsh detractors.

Turkey and the Arab Spring

Turkey’s relationship to the Middle East is particularly layered and complex. It neither belongs to the Arab world nor to the European Christian world, yet is deeply implicated in the history, culture, economic and politics of both. Since 2002, Turkey has had dramatic ups and downs internally, regionally, and internationally. During this entire period it has been governed controversially by the AKP, which has been attacked as both authoritarian and trending toward Islamism. Its supporters emphasize tradition, social justice, and rapid economic development.

After the upheavals of the Arab Spring in early 2011, Turkey was popularly viewed as a model of stability and development throughout the region, a country that had managed to reconcile secularism and religion. Its prime minister (now president), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was the most popular leader
in the Middle East; its foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, became one of the most influential diplomats in the world, admired for his energetic efforts to promote peaceful conflict resolution and compromise and to enlarge Turkey’s political horizons in all directions.

Secular opposition

Yet there were many bumps in the road. At home, the secular opposition has never been willing to accept the legitimacy of the AKP leadership, despite its extraordinary record of economic growth. At the same time this opposition was frustrated by its inability to produce either a credible alternative
program or interesting potential political leaders. As a result, the AKP has won election after election and the opposition became more and more embittered.

Since 2011, Erdoğan has relied on his electoral mandate and grassroots popularity to govern in a more overtly authoritarian style. He has especially agitated the secular ranks of “white Turks” with his rants about such social issues as abortion, alcohol, education, the role of women, and the desirability of population increase. Erdoğan seems increasingly to be abandoning any effort to lead in a manner that is inclusive of opposition concerns. To some extent, this is a reasonable reaction to the inflammatory behavior of the main opposition parties and media.

The Gezi Park uprising

The demonstrations in Gezi Park in 2013 showed the anti-Erdoğan fury that exists in Turkey, with its contradictory interpretations exhibiting the polarization ripping the country apart. There is no doubt that the Turkish police overreacted in a brutal manner and that Erdoğan handled the incident awkwardly, endorsing the use of excessive force. It is also the case that after the initial phase of the protests against turning an historic Istanbul park into a shopping mall, the second phase of the events in Gezi were more confrontational, apparently seeking to imitate the anti-Morsi street politics that created a crisis of governability in Egypt.

In the last year or so, the domestic scene in Turkey has been further roiled by conflict between the government and the Hizmet movement, led by an Islamic scholar and preacher living in Pennsylvania named Fethullah Gülen. The AKP accuses Hizmet of setting up a “parallel state” by deliberately
infiltrating its loyalists into the bureaucracy, especially the police and judiciary. Hizmet accuses Erdoğan of corruption, crony capitalism, and authoritarianism. As with the displaced secular opposition, Hizmet’s defection from the AKP cause has so far not diminished the AKP’s level of popular support.

The Syrian civil war

In recent years, Turkey has experienced a series of setbacks internationally. The AKP’s approach to Syria has been problematic in several ways that have weakened the overall credibility of Turkish relations with the region. Davutoğlu’s signature approach of “zero problems with neighbors” was
launched with fanfare as Turkey embraced al-Assad’s Syria, ending years of tension. When the Arab Spring arrived and Syrians rose up against the authoritarianism of the Assad regime in Damascus, Turkey first tried to urge democratic reforms. When these failed to materialize, Ankara sided with the
rebels and especially the Muslim Brotherhood component of the many-sided Syrian opposition, perceiving the conflict as certain to be quickly resolved in favor of the anti-government side. Damascus accused Turkey of intervening on behalf of the insurgency and promoting Sunni sectarianism.

Relations with Israel

A second vector of difficulty arose when Turkey criticized Israel after the breakdown of Turkey’s effort to mediate a solution to the conflict between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. The initial criticisms focused on Israel’s behavior in Gaza, especially the military operations known as Cast Lead that began at the end of 2008. These tensions reached their climax in 2010 when Israeli commandos attacked the Turkish civilian ship Mavi Marmara in international waters, killing nine Turkish passengers. The ship was the lead vessel in a flotilla of small, unarmed ships seeking to challenge Israel’s unlawful blockade of Gaza by delivering humanitarian goods directly
to the beleaguered Gazan population.

The problems with Israel overlapped with and reinforced some tensions with the United States. It seemed that the U.S. government expected Turkey to be as submissive after the Cold War as it had been during it. The AKP clearly sought to maintain its role in NATO as part of the Western alliance.

It also sought continuity in its relationship with the United States, but felt entitled to act as an independent player in the region. This posture came up against Washington’s insistence on having a free hand in the Middle East.

When Turkey, in collaboration with Brazil, sought to defuse nuclear tensions with Iran in 2010, Washington reacted angrily, reminding Turkey not to get out of line, as President Obama called for strengthened sanctions as the centerpiece of its reliance on coercive diplomacy to gain its goals in relation to Iran’s nuclear program. The Turkish initiative, designed to lower tensions, ran directly counter to the belligerently anti-Iranian approach being advocated by Israel.

Eliminating the 'deep state'

What followed was a worldwide campaign to discredit the AKP leadership, portraying Erdoğan as a second Putin. In my view, the AKP deserves a more balanced treatment. Turkey’s achievements since 2002 far outweigh its shortcomings. Erdoğan is skilled in surrounding himself with highly capable
officials and advisors, especially in key positions. Turkey’s economic development has been sustained far more successfully than that of other countries in the region, or in Europe for that matter. Perhaps the greatest of the AKP’s achievements has been eliminating the “deep state” as a force that had lurked below the surface of Turkish politics ever since the republic was established in 1920.

Gaining civilian control over security policies repudiated the Atatürk tradition, which allowed the
armed forces to play a custodial role in relation to the elected government and had seemed a permanent feature of Turkish political life, producing periodic military coups as well as supervision over the behavior of political leaders. Challenging this structure required great political skill and commitment as well as accepting the risk of provoking a coup, which nearly happened in the early years of AKP governance. Turkey also did its utmost to bring greater stability and prosperity to the region, through diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and trade/investment relations.

Beyond this, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan were innovative in encouraging diplomatic and economic
relations with Africa and Latin America, regions Turkey had previously ignored. As with so many countries in this period, Turkey’s fundamental problem has been the polarization of beliefs and affinities within its own population, which has created intense negativity in the political atmosphere.

It is rather remarkable that the AKP has so far been able to ride this unruly horse of polarization without worse mishaps. The Turkish leadership is being daily challenged by a defamatory campaign by its opponents at home and abroad designed to undermine the legitimacy of the state, an undertaking aided by the international media.

The threat of ISIS

The 2014 emergence of ISIS near Turkey’s borders has added yet another destabilizing and daunting challenge, one further complicated by Ankara’s search for a peaceful resolution of its own long, violent conflict with its large Kurdish minority. Turkey finds itself pulled in opposite directions. ISIS is an effective force in the ongoing effort to topple the Assad regime, but is also guilty of massive atrocities and is the target of an American-led intervention.

ISIS poses a difficult dilemma for Turkey—to give priority either to sectarian objectives or to the defeat of extremist challenges to the status quo. These posts seek to explain AKP’s political strength at home and the innovativeness of its foreign policy while taking due account of its mistakes
and setbacks. All political actors, within the region and beyond, made mistakes during this turbulent period; while Turkey made important miscalculations, its intentions were constructive and its record stands up well compared to other main players in the region, including the United States.

Looking ahead

I anticipate two notable challenges for Turkey in 2015. The first is to respond to the worldwide Armenian campaign associated with observing the centennial anniversary of the 1915 massacres. The Erdoğan leadership has been more forthcoming in acknowledging these tragic events than its predecessors, but has not been willing to accede to the Armenian demand that they be acknowledged as “genocide.” One post tries to interpret this open wound and how it might be treated for the benefit of both sides. The second challenge involves the December 2015 UN climate-change conference in Paris, expected to be a make-or-break occasion with respect to heeding scientific warnings about global warming. To date Turkey has been extremely passive about international limits on carbon emissions and gives the impression of being unwilling to burden its economic ambitions by acting in an environmentally responsible manner.

To buy Chaos and Counterrevolution: After the Arab Spring visit Zed Books.